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Caveat 
This Comment has been prepared as a first response to the news that a merger may occur.  It is 
not intended to be a comprehensive analysis, but serves rather to highlight some of the issues 
which, from the perspective of a long-time observer of competition and regulation in the New 
Zealand telecommunications sector, would appear to warrant consideration.   
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If the mooted takeover of TelstraClear (TCL) by Vodafone is to go ahead, it will be the most 
significant non-regulatory structural change in the New Zealand telecommunications marketplace 
since the merger of TelstraSaturn and Clear Communications in December 2001.  The merger is a 
game-changer because it would lead to the creation of a fully vertically integrated 
telecommunications company providing a complete range of fixed and mobile networks (at least 
in the areas where TCL‟s cable network exists), a matter of merely months after New Zealand‟s 
incumbent integrated operator Telecom New Zealand (TCNZ) was „required‟ to structurally 
separate its fixed line network from its retail and mobile operations.  The implications for both of 
the separated TCNZ firms (new) Telecom and Chorus are not trivial.  There are also likely to be 
some significant challenges arising for both regulation and the Government‟s new Ultrafast 
Broadband (UFB) network from the presence of a strong, integrated multi-infrastructure provider.    
 
A Short Trip Through History1 
In order to fully understand the implications of the proposed merger, it is necessary to recap a 
little history of the New Zealand telecommunications landscape, to put in perspective the 
extensive merger and consolidation activity that has taken place in the sector following the rapid 
expansion of entrants and the introduction of internet access into the bundle of 
telecommunications products offered.  
Vodafone 
Vodafone entered the New Zealand market in November 1998 when it bought the New Zealand 
mobile network operation of BellSouth New Zealand Limited.  BellSouth had operated in the 
New Zealand market since 1993.  In May 2003, it surpassed TCNZ‟s number of mobile 
connections, and has been the market leader ever since, in both mobile voice and data.  Since the 
introduction of local loop unbundling in New Zealand after the passing of the 
Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006, the firm has become a major retailer of fixed 
telephone and broadband connections, and has installed unbundling equipment in many Telecom 
exchanges. In 2006, it bought fixed line Internet Service Provider (ISP) iHug. In 2011, 
Vodafone‟s retail residential internet market share was 13% (Telecom‟s share was 49%)2.  
 
                                                     
1
 Most of the data for this section comes from Howell, B. (2007). A Pendulous Progression: New 
Zealand’s Telecommunications Regulation 1987-2007.   
http://iscr.org.nz/f378,10548/10548_Pendulous_Progress_v_4_12_Nov.pdf  
2
 New Zealand Commerce Commission . (2012). Annual Telecommunications Monitoring Report 2011 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/TelecommunicationsMarketAnnualMonitoringReports/ p 20.  
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TelstraClear 
TelstraClear arose from the merger of TelstraSaturn and Clear Communications in 2001.  
 
Clear Communications entered New Zealand in 1991. With the benefit of a nationwide fibre-optic 
backhaul network courtesy of minor shareholder New Zealand Railways, it quickly built up a 
market presence, despite its protracted litigation between 1991 and 1994 regarding the 
interconnection price charged by TCNZ. Clear‟s initial focus was the long distance calling and 
business markets.  It was a major beneficiary of the explosive growth of dial-up internet access in 
New Zealand as it was able to take advantage of call termination fee arbitrage opportunities 
offered by the interaction of the „free local calling‟ Kiwi Share obligation and its interconnection 
contract with TCNZ by sharing the revenues with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in order to 
ensure that a disproportionately large number of them became its commercial customers (dial-up 
internet calls being substantially longer on average than voice calls)
3
.   
 
TelstraSaturn was the result of the sale in 1999 of media company Saturn, which deployed New 
Zealand‟s first converged cable television and broadband network in Kapiti, Wellington and 
Christchurch, to Telstra NZ, which entered the New Zealand market in 1996.  Telstra NZ had 
struggled to make its presence felt in the NZ market until its purchase of Saturn, which had a 
predominantly residential customer base.  When the new Telecommunications Act 2001 required 
the mandatory regulated wholesaling of telephone and internet connection, the firm rapidly 
advanced towards having a nationwide presence in both the business and residential markets.   
 
TelstraClear‟s story in New Zealand has been one based almost exclusively upon taking 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the takeover of, and regulated and negotiated access to, 
the infrastructure of other providers.  TCL was one of the most ardent advocates for stringent 
regulation of TCNZ
4
, and has been one of the most significant beneficiaries of the regulatory 
changes in 2001 and 2006 granting wholesale and unbundled access respectively. It has been 
actively involved in the installation of infrastructure in unbundled exchanges. In 2011, 
TelstraClear‟s share of the residential retail internet market was 16%5.   
 
                                                     
3
 Karel, A. (2003) The Development and Implication of Free ISPs in New Zealand. Wellington, New 
Zealand: ISCR  http://www.iscr.org.nz/f209,4313/4313_Free_ISPs_220903.pdf  
4
 Although it is noted that TelstraSaturn argued strongly against regulatory intervention in the broadband 
market at the Tel;ecommunications Inquiry in 2000, when it was in the midst of rolling out its CATV 
network.  
5
 Commerce Commission (2012) ibid.  
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Although the Saturn purchase enabled TelstraSaturn to compete at the infrastructure level with 
the incumbent Telecom New Zealand, (and indeed, a Direct to Home TV service was due to be 
launched in late 2001), further deployment of the CATV network was halted in August 2001 
when the merger with Clear was first mooted.  When the details of wholesale access to TCNZ‟s 
network were announced on 29 November 2002, TelstraClear‟s then-CEO Rosemary Howard 
made it clear that New Zealand‟s nascent experience with infrastructure competition (between 
copper and cable) would stop with only the Wellington region and part of Christchurch having a 
real fixed line network choice (“we believe it‟s more industry efficient for TelstraClear to buy 
from Telecom rather than build duplicate networks to reach consumers who are widely spread 
throughout New Zealand”6).    
 
Nonetheless, whilst there has been no expansion in the areas covered by the CATV network since 
2001, following an upgrade to DOCSIS 3 technology in 2010, TCL has been offering ultra-fast 
broadband connections for sale
7
. Whilst very few ultra-fast connections have been sold, the 
investment upgrade has corresponded with an interesting turn-around in the mix of broadband 
connections in the New Zealand market.  In June 2011, PointTopic reported the firm having 
105,000 cable broadband subscribers, giving it around 10% of the New Zealand broadband 
market
8. The same dataset shows that TCL‟s cable broadband growth rate between 2010Q3 and 
201Q4 was 14%, compared to a DSL growth rate of 8% over the same period.  In 2011Q4, 
PointTopic‟s estimates show New Zealand having a broadband uptake rate of 25 per 100 
population. A conservative estimate
9
 of the cable broadband uptake rate in the regions where it is 
offered is, using these figures, 13 per 100 population.  Whilst it is likely that the broadband 
uptake rate in Wellington and Christchurch exceeds the national average
10
, these figures would 
tend to suggest that in New Zealand, as well as in other countries (such as the United States, the 
                                                     
6
 http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/media_release_detail.cfm?newsid=81&news_type=tclArchive,  
7
 Currently offered as „WarpSpeed‟ up to 100 Mbps downstream/10Mbps upstream, but previously offered 
with speed of up to 40Mbps downstream.  
http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/residential/inhome/internet/warpspeed-next-generation/index.cfm  
8
 http://point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/profiles2/new-zealand-broadband-overview.htm  
9
 Taking the entire Christchurch and Wellington region populations at that time of 772,000 (Statistics New 
Zealand).  This will necessarily yield a low-end estimate of the cable broadband uptake rate, as the network 
does not cover the entire region.   
10
 As the levels of income and education, as well as genuine infrastructure competition – all of which are 
higher than the national average in the population considered - are correlated with higher total uptake.  See  
Boyle, Howell & Zhang (2008) http://iscr.org.nz/f410,11598/11598_LLUBroadband01c_rev_300708.pdf  
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Netherlands and Japan), cable broadband uptake rates will usually equal if not exceed those of 
ADSL where the infrastructures compete directly against each other
11
.   
 
TelstraClear has also relied entirely on other providers for provisioning of mobile services to its 
customers.   Until 2007, it resold Vodafone‟s GMS and UMTS services, although in 2006 
announced that it would deploy its own UTMS network initially in Tauranga and then expanding 
to other regions.  This led to considerable acrimony with Vodafone, with the consequence that 
from 2007, it began reselling connections on TCNZ‟s CDMA network.  However, when 
negotiations for access to TCNZ‟s new UMTS network broke down in 2009, the reseller 
relationship with Vodafone was reactivated.   
The ISP Market 
Whilst Telecom has long held a large market share for the sale of telephone connections, the ISP 
market in New Zealand (which mediates the means by which an individual‟s internet data is 
sourced and distributed between points of internet interconnection, distinct from the telecoms 
component where it is shipped over the consumer‟s fixed or mobile phone service to the ISP‟s 
nearest point of interconnection (the „last mile‟) has traditionally been very much more widely 
shared.  Since the early 2000s, Telecom (initially via its proprietary ISP Xtra, and then 
subsequently under the Telecom brand), has seldom held more than half the market for ISP 
connections.  Whilst initially Telecom had a disproportionately large share of the (initially small) 
broadband connection market, as the broadband market has grown, both the number of 
connections and the share retailed by competitors to Telecom has grown, in large part reflecting 
the fact that broadband has most typically sold as a replacement for an existing dial-up 
connection.  It is noted that at its peak in 2003, the New Zealand dial-up market was shared 
between Xtra (with around 50% market share), TelstraClear‟s equivalent ClearNet and a number 
of non-telco ISPs such as iHug, Paradise and Orcon
12
.   
 
Since unbundling was made available, there has been a significant trend towards the vertical 
integration of telecommunications retail service and infrastructure providers and ISPs.  In this 
period, Vodafone acquired iHug, TelstrClear acquired Paradise and Kordia bought Orcon. The 
vertically integrated competitors to Telecom then used their relationships with ISP customers as a 
                                                     
11
 For more detail on the Dutch and Japanese markets, see (respectively), Sadowski (2012) 
http://iscr.org.nz/f714,19789/19789_Presentation_Wellington_2012.pptx and Sugaya (2012) 
http://iscr.org.nz/f726,20253/20253_Minoru_Sugaya_ISCR_Presentation_29_March_2012.pdf  
12
 Howell & Obren (2003) http://iscr.org.nz/f212,4362/4362_nz_telecommunications_usag_090703.pdf  
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key means of securing their telephone line rental custom as well – in the well-known „service 
bundling‟ approach.  Thus, even though the share of broadband lines sold by wholesalers and 
unbundling entrants has increased, and the telecommunications market has been deemed to have 
become more competitive, the market share of internet connections (broadband and dial-up) sold 
by non-Telecom ISPs has remained largely unchanged at around 50% (ComCom p 20).  A 
notable effect over this time has been the decrease of retail ISPs and the consolidation of the 
market whereby it appears that the market share of the „bundles‟ is converging towards the 
historic market shares of the respective ISPs.  In addition, unlike the 1990s, when significant 
market entry occurred, there has not been a single new entrant into the fixed telecoms and 
broadband market since the passing of the Telecommunications Act in 2001.  Rather, 
consolidation has been the dominant feature
13
.   
 
Fast-Forward to 2012 
So what does this history mean in respect of a proposed merger between TelstraClear and 
Vodafone in 2012?  At the very least, it would appear to be simply a further step in the long-
established pattern of mergers and consolidation in the fixed-line component of the sector over 
the 2000s.  As only one of the firms has its own mobile network, it might be presumed that there 
is little of concern, as the mobile customers serviced by TelstrClear are already in effect 
Vodafone customers anyway.   
Substantial Lessening of Competition in the ISP Market? 
A principled economic analysis should look first at defining the relevant markets and examining 
the effects in each. However, with this merger, there are many different ways available to define 
the relevant markets.  Should the market definitions be based on the nature of the technologies 
sold (copper, mobile, fibre) or the service bundles offered (various combinations of fixed line, 
mobile and broadband)? In the business market or residential market, or combined?   In the retail 
market alone, or in the wholesale markets too?  And how should the analysis treat the fact that the 
new merged company in effect is recreating a vertically-integrated network-owning fixed-line 
operator (at least in some geographic markets) of the sort which the combination of regulation 
and Ultrafast broadband (UFB) negotiations have sought to dismantle?  That is, how do the 
effects of the proposed merger affect the new separated companies Telecom and Chorus?   
 
                                                     
13
 Srzich (2012).  
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I do not propose to address all of these issues in this preliminary discussion. The proposal to 
merge the number 2 and number 3 providers of ISP services to create a firm with around 30% 
market share, where the market leader (Telecom) has around a 50% share, falls outside the safe 
harbours defined in the Commerce Commission merger guidelines. Hence the merger is likely to 
come to the attention of the Commission as a merger that could result in a substantial lessening of 
competition.  It is noted that: 
 “The Commission is of the view that an acquisition is unlikely to substantially lessen 
 competition in a market where, after the proposed acquisition, either of the following 
 situations exist: 
• the three-firm concentration ratio in the relevant market  is below 70 percent and the 
market share of the combined entity is less than in the order of a 40 percent share; or 
• the three-firm concentration ratio in the relevant market is above 70 percent and the 
market share of the combined entity is less than in the order of 20 percent.”14 
 
As the three-firm concentration ratio is over 70% (indeed, it is nearly 80%) and the market share 
of the combined entity is more than 20% (it is around 30%) it would seem likely that in respect of 
the internet access market at least, an investigation is warranted.  Thus, although some 
commentators have reacted to the proposed merger with claims that it will increase competitive 
intensity (in the sense that it creates a single firm with more power to counter Telecom as market 
leader), it may lead to reductions in actual competition in respect of the number of firms in the 
important internet access space.  This is an important point, given that it is the ISP component of 
the service „bundles‟ which appears to be driving the development of competitive interaction in 
the retail segment of the market following the regulatory changes in the mid-2000s.  Reducing 
choice in this component will necessarily lead to some compromises in the range of services 
offered to consumers.  Whether this is economically material is rightly a matter on which the 
Commerce Commission should adjudicate.  
The Ultrafast Broadband Connection Market(s) 
This consideration leads naturally to the second point for consideration – what the merger means 
for the broadband internet access market in particular.  Whilst there is still a (declining) market 
for fixed line voice connections, the growth areas of the market currently are in respect of mobile 
voice and data, and broadband.  Given that in the near term, fixed broadband connections will 
replace dial-up internet connections, the „fixed line internet access market‟ is becoming 
                                                     
14
 Commerce Commission (2004). Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines  
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/assets/Imported-from-old-
site/BusinessCompetition/MergersAcquisitions/ClearanceProcessGuidelines/ContentFiles/Documents/Mer
gers-and-AcquisitionsGuidelines-2003.pdf p 25  
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increasingly the „fixed broadband internet access market.  The relevant forward-looking question 
is how this affects the market for fibre broadband connections. 
 
The fixed broadband market is not, in the New Zealand context, a simple single nationwide 
market, as different providers are competing in different geographic markets using different 
technologies.  In the short-to-medium term (the 8 years over which it is anticipated the UFB will 
roll out), copper broadband access will continue to be a feature. Technological innovation is 
making ever-faster speeds available.  Chorus‟ cabinetisation programme was completed in 2011, 
meaning almost all urban consumers (in areas where there are 500 or more connections) have 
access to comparatively fast (by OECD standards) copper-based connections.  The separation of 
Chorus as the infrastructure provider from Telecom (the retailer) means that there is no special 
advantage for Telecom in respect of internet connections to these cabinets.  In the areas where 
there is likely a long wait for fibre connections, having two more-or-less equal broadband 
providers (Telecom and the merged Vodafone-TelstraClear) will likely increase competitive 
intensity on the copper network, in terms of both customer market share and quality innovation.  
This would suggest that there may be a renewed level of interest in the deployment of sub-loop 
unbundling, where one or other of the retailers chooses to install its infrastructure in the cabinets 
in order to provide a differentiated service to the one offered by the other using Chorus 
infrastructure.  Such investments would not be as likely to occur if the retail market was spread 
more widely (as under the current market split). 
UFB Uptake delays
15
 
Increased competitive intensity on the (Chorus) copper network will likely lead to delays in the 
uptake of UFB connections in a separated fixed line world.  Where the industry faces a 
downward-sloping average cost curve (as is the case for sunk costs such as those required for sub-
loop unbundling investments), then the likelihood of investment occurring is affected by the 
steepness of the average cost curve and the number of possible investors.   The larger is the 
number of potential investors, the riskier it is that they will be able to get sufficient customers to 
recoup the investment cost.  Therefore, they may all sit back and wait to see what the other 
participants will do, even though investing would be desirable from the consumer welfare 
perspective.  If a merger reduces the number of potential investors, then the risk that the investor 
will not get sufficient customers to justify the investment is reduced, making investment more 
likely. 
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 These issues are discussed more fully in Heatley & Howell (2010) 
http://iscr.org.nz/f607,17391/17391_Heatley_Howell_Regulatory_Implications_Final.pdf  
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From these assumptions, then, we would infer that a merger between TCL and V (merge to 30% 
market share) makes it more likely that sub-loop unbundling will occur with the merger than 
under the counterfactual of investment when each had a lower market share (16% & 13%).   
 
The more the retailers invest in unbundled infrastructure to offer faster services, the less likely 
they will be to want to sell fibre connections, especially if they have yet to recoup the sub-loop 
unbundling investments.  As fibre operators cannot have a retail relationship with end users, they 
are entirely at the mercy of the retailers to drive the substitution of copper connections with fibre 
ones.  This effect will be felt regardless of whether the UFBCo is Chorus or one of the regional 
providers.   
 
The merger is thus likely to extend the life of the copper network beyond what it would have been 
had the merger not occurred.  The risk is that this will decrease economic efficiency as the two 
networks (copper and fibre) will run in parallel longer than would have been the case without 
additional merger-induced investment.  The alternative is that in order to induce more rapid UFB 
uptake (or timely shutdown of the copper network), there will have to be a substantial transfer of 
wealth from the UFBCo (or Chorus as the copper operator) to the retailers (e.g. discounted fibre 
access prices or other inducements).  The only other alternative would be for the 
Telecommunications Commission to step in and substantially increase the cooper access prices in 
order to discourage investment in sub-loop unbundling in the first place, or to accelerate 
substitution to fibre after the fact.   However, under the current Act, the Commission‟s primary 
regulatory responsibility is the promotion of competition on the copper network.  Its powers with 
regard to the fibre network are confined to the monitoring and enforcement of the terms agreed 
between the UFBCos and the government.  Deviation from this brief would require explicit 
instruction from the government (under s 19A of the Telecommunications Act, the government 
can instruct the Commission in writing to have regard for its economic policies). Under this 
scenario, the proposed merger invokes the need for political, as well as economic consideration.  
The ‘Other Investment Problem’ 
A similar, if not exacerbated, problem for the achievement of desired UFB uptake rates exists in 
relation to the fact that the merged firm itself has its own infrastructure (DOCSIS 3-enabled 
CATV) in two geographic markets – Wellington and Christchurch.  The „History‟ section shows 
that, despite only offering the connections in these two regions, the growth rate of broadband 
connections sold on the cable network in recent times is almost double that of DSL connections 
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available nationwide.  As broadband uptake is strongly driven by the ISP retail relationship, 
depending upon the capacity of the CATV network, real potential exists for strong customer 
growth on this network from existing Vodafone broadband customers transferred. 
 
The price paid for TCL will likely incorporate the value of these synergies.  Hence as observers, 
we would expect that the higher the price paid for TCL, the more likely it is that we will observe 
a strategy promoting the migration of Vodafone copper internet customers to the cable network 
and not the UFB.  
 
Telecom is unlikely to be affected by this, since it never had these retail customers in the first 
place.  However Chorus stands to lose market share on copper. Chorus could maintain its copper 
market share by discounting the price for copper access in those areas where it faces the copper-
CATV migration (just as Telecom did when faced by competition from TCL in the first place).  
But this places pressure on the Commission, which has recently moved to „re-average‟ copper 
access prices.  It is extremely difficult to sustain geographically averaged prices across the 
country in the face of selective infrastructure competition in a specific geographic location, whilst 
ensuring that the firm bound to offer them remains profitable
16
.  This is attested by the complexity 
of the hotly-contested TSO provisions which sought to redress the imbalances arising from the 
„old‟ Telecom facing „cherry-picked‟ infrastructure competition in profitable but not unprofitable 
marekts.  
 
This raises a number of questions for the regulator: 
 Is a separated Chorus required to offer low prices to all access seekers nationwide, or can 
it price differently in Christchurch and Wellington?   
 Should Chorus respond, if the result is to move customers off copper quicker than would 
have been the case otherwise?   
 How does the selective move in a small geographic area affect the prices charged by 
Chorus for all services over the country if its returns in these two areas dip below what 
might have been the case when the ULL prices were set, and financial viability comes 
into question?   
 
                                                     
16
For a fuller discussion, see Heatley & Howell (2010a)  
http://iscr.org.nz/f560,16057/16057_Abolishing_the_TSO_Compensation_25-Mar-10_v3_.pdf  
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However, in the long run, it is the UFBCos (Chorus in Wellington and Enable in Christchurch) 
who will bear the cost of strategic migration to the CATV network.  As customers become 
established on the faster CATV network, they are less likely to need to migrate to the UFB when 
it is available.  Where there is only copper and fibre available, and Chorus is the provider of both, 
then it can to some extent internalise the costs of moving customers across networks by using its 
relationship with retailers.  But when the retailer owns its own network and is not buying services 
from Chorus or the UFBCo for the customer, then the strategic options available to the UFBCos 
to capture market share are very much more limited.  This problem arises because of the 
fundamental assumption made in the New Zealand case: that both fibre and copper were „natural 
monopoly infrastructures when mandating separation.  In Christchurch and Wellington they are 
not.  The Vodafone-TCL merger threatens to make this already existing problem much bigger 
than it would have been otherwise.  
And Yet Another ‘Infrastructure Problem’ 
As the capabilities of both copper and mobile technologies increase, the likelihood that there will 
be a distinction between broadband internet access on fixed line and mobile networks becomes 
more blurred.  A Vodafone -TCL merger would create a firm with over 55% mobile market share 
and 30% fixed line market share.  It is thus well-placed to use its stronger fixed line internet 
market share to increase the potential to sell all services over its networks - including ever-more-
capable mobile connections in lieu of fixed line broadband, especially in those areas where it will 
take longer for the UFB to be deployed.  Whilst Telecom can also sell connections on its mobile 
network, it lacks the full range of strategic options available to the merged firm, in respect of 
Wellington and Christchurch at least. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, therefore, it can be seen that the proposed merger throws up some very interesting 
challenges to be addressed by both the Telecommunications Commission, in respect of ongoing 
sector regulation, and the Commerce Commission, in evaluating the effects on the economy of 
the proposed merger.  It also raises questions about the extent to which the matter may invoke 
political as well as economic and regulatory considerations.  
 
The analysis to support the merger clearance application, in particular, will not be simple.  There 
are clearly many different geographic, technological, customer and product dimensions to the 
markets which will be relevant to the assessment.  In addition, the analysis is complicated by the 
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fact that the future of the market is influenced not just by normal market factors, but also 
government policy aspirations as they relate to the UFB project. This raises some very interesting 
questions as to how such an analysis should proceed given that policy concerns are typically 
outside the scope of a merger analysis.   It will be interesting to see how the Commission 
approaches this analysis, and how the policymakers respond, should the current talks progress 
into a more formal offer. 
 
We at ISCR watch with interest to see how this mooted merger proceeds.  
 
 
